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FAR EAST

Vietnam: *Fueling the War**Saigon Forces Stirring*

Communist troops in South Vietnam will encounter a more vigorous foe during the dry season. South Vietnam's military and pacification forces appear to be recovering from their general loss of momentum this summer as they set out on new offensive operations on several fronts. This usually happens about this time of year, when the allies move to pre-empt Communist plans for a seasonal campaign.

In the northern provinces, where the Viet Cong are still strong in some rural areas, the South Vietnamese have mounted an ambitious new campaign to disrupt enemy base areas and roll back Viet Cong cadre and supporters. Reinforcements have been sent into Binh Dinh Province along the central coast to help blunt a sustained surge of Communist terrorism. South Vietnamese regular units from Military Region 3 around Saigon are pushing across the Cambodian border in greater strength to prevent any new Communist buildup. In the Mekong Delta, drives into long-time Viet Cong strongholds are continuing, although action has generally been light.

Government forces have been most successful so far in the northern provinces, where they are making extensive use of the once-scorned regional and popular forces as mobile units. This has made it possible to bring considerable strength to bear even in districts from which many US troops have been withdrawn. The South Vietnamese reportedly are also effectively using defectors to help find base areas and Communist cadre. Last week the South Vietnamese reported killing several hundred Communists in sweeps through base areas in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces; similar drives are planned for the other northern provinces in coming weeks.

Enemy Falters

Communist efforts to reverse continuing government pacification gains appear unimpressive. Although the momentum of pacification has slowed appreciably from the spectacular advances made in 1969 and setbacks have occurred in some areas, enemy activity is having little impact on the security situation in most of the country. Moreover, the Communists' attempts to rebuild their apparatus seem to be running into problems as the population base easily available for recruitment shrinks. Nonetheless, persistent enemy efforts have helped keep government casualties high and many South Vietnamese uncommitted.

Several recent sources have provided good general insights into the current picture. According to a prisoner from Long An Province adjacent to Saigon, for example, the massive flow of government personnel into the province in the past two years has severely restricted enemy recruiting efforts. Because the Communists lost much of their military strength in early 1968 and government forces gradually moved into the countryside, the Communist apparatus has been unable to tap the local populace for manpower the way it had in the past.

The Communists, working hard to halt the erosion of their influence and control, pose a direct threat to many people and an indirect one to many more. In a recent survey of rural areas, more than half of the respondents said that small to medium-sized Viet Cong units have the ability to enter their hamlets at night. Even though periods of heavy Communist terrorism and agitation, such as occurred in several provinces during the spring and summer, have intimidated the populace, the enemy has not sustained the pressure

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and subsequently has lost ground in the face of more aggressive government countermeasures.

Buddhists Remain Divided

The militant An Quang Buddhists remain divided over antigovernment political tactics. At a conference in Japan earlier this month Thich Thien Minh, the leading activist, issued a strongly worded peace proposal calling for an in-place cease-fire next January and the immediate appointment of a United Nations supervisory commission. Minh demanded that Saigon release all political prisoners and appealed to the US to let the Vietnamese people replace the present "dictatorial, corrupt, and repressive regime" through elections.

Minh apparently acted without the approval of the An Quang leadership, which reportedly had authorized a more moderate statement. Buddhist

officials have professed ignorance of Minh's proposal and have refused to comment on it. The government has been only mildly critical of Minh's statement, but some Buddhist leaders probably fear it will yet spark a government crackdown on their political activity.

Minh may hope to kick off a new peace campaign, but his long-time rival, Thich Tri Quang, probably will continue to use his influence to temper the An Quang's antigovernment activities.

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Tri Quang went out of his way to remove doubts that he and his followers are sympathetic toward the Communists by emphasizing his aversion to a coalition government even if the alternative is a longer war. Nevertheless, Tri Quang remains pessimistic about the future and still believes that the Communists will eventually prevail.

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LAOS: When Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma returned from his two-month trip abroad this week he was greeted by a renewed Communist bid to get the long-stalled peace talks under way. In a telegram of 23 October to Souvanna's representative for the discussions, the chief Pathet Lao negotiator called for the "earliest possible meeting" and noted that special envoy Souk Vongsak would arrive in Vientiane shortly to "prepare concrete questions" for the talks. The message did not depart from the standard Communist line that the dialogue would be between representa-

tives of the "two princes," but it is possible that the Pathet Lao, as well as the government, may be willing to evade the impasse on this issue in the near future. Government leaders were expressing optimism this week that substantive negotiations might begin at Khang Khay as early as December and even lead to some sort of settlement within six months. Military activity was unusually low throughout the country in recent days, although government forces are anticipating a counterattack along the southwestern edge of the Plaine des Jarres.

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North Vietnam's Economy Not Restored

The DRV economy has not yet recovered its previous levels of output in the two years since the bombing stopped. Government leaders continue to blame inferior management and poor labor utilization, but the war effort undeniably has restricted economic recovery. Although few pressures or incentives have been brought to bear, the entire leadership from Le Duan on down has appealed time and time again for harder work and better management. The response apparently has been disappointing.

Even with the help of new, higher yielding strains, rice output this year will still fall short of the 4.5-million tons produced in 1965. Imports of foodstuffs, required to offset reduced domestic output, are now declining after hitting a peak of almost 800,000 tons in 1968. Nevertheless, sizable quantities will undoubtedly be needed at least through 1971. During the first nine months of this year North Vietnam imported about 510,000 tons of foodstuffs as compared with 610,000 tons for the same period of 1969.

In industry the recovery is even slower. Most of the small number of relatively modern plants that formed the core of North Vietnam's industrial sector were high-priority targets of the bombing program and have only been partially repaired or returned from dispersed locations in the countryside. Power plants in the main power

network have received the most attention. In 1967 capacity was reduced to only 20 percent of the pre-bombing level. At present about two thirds of the pre-bombing capacity is operating. The Haiphong cement plant, which was completely out of operation in 1967, has now been restored to two thirds of its 1965 capacity. Apatite exports, almost completely suspended from 1967 through 1969, have been resumed, although at greatly reduced levels. Coal output remains below pre-bombing levels. Construction has been started again at two large-scale projects, the Soviet-aided Thac Ba Hydroelectric Power plant and the Chinese-aided Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Works.

In the past two years the North Vietnamese economic planners have particularly emphasized the production of industrial crops and the construction of small-scale, light industrial facilities to expand the output of consumer goods, both for the home market and for export. Such a course involved small capital outlays and a short planning period to coincide with the year-to-year planning that had been instituted after 1967. As long as the war is conducted at current levels and other Communist countries continue to offset lost domestic production, initiation of an all-out economic recovery program will probably be postponed.

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Cambodia: *Marking Time*

Military activity continues at a slow pace as the Communists conserve their resources apparently in preparation for increased activity during the coming dry season. Enemy harassing fire and small-scale probes against scattered government positions occur daily, but there have been

no significant Communist ground assaults since late August. The intensity of enemy pressure against major population centers in recent weeks has dropped markedly, and there has also been a discernible decline in Communist terrorist actions throughout the countryside.

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The retarded pace of the war during the late summer and early fall was not unexpected, in view of several problems confronting the Communists. The monsoon rains, for example, make it difficult for them to pre-position supplies and move troops overland through flooded rural areas. They are operating, moreover, in an unfamiliar and largely hostile environment, without the support of any long-established local organizations. And, had they adopted economical tactics, they faced additional heavy casualties from a combination of Cambodian tenacity and allied air power.

[redacted] although the Communists' short-term priorities may have shifted from South Vietnam to Cambodia, they do not foresee an early decision there.

[redacted] even though

it would be "easy" to topple the Lon Nol government militarily, the Cambodian Communist movement is not strong enough to form an effective or lasting government. Additional Vietnamese Communist assets will be moved from South Vietnam to Cambodia, therefore, in order to help the Cambodians organize existing liberated areas.

[redacted] In any event, the enemy's capability to step up the fighting should improve shortly. With better weather, supplies should begin to pour through the Lao infiltration complex into Cambodia. In addition, fresh North Vietnamese units and replacements—some probably already ticketed for action in the Cambodian theater—are now making their way south, and cross-country movement within Cambodia should become much easier. [redacted]

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Soviet Industrial Growth Dips in Third Quarter

The growth of civilian industrial production in the USSR slipped in the third quarter of 1970 from the relatively good performance posted during the first six months. Output during July-September is estimated to have risen by only about 5½ percent over the same portion of 1969 in contrast with the 7½-percent increase achieved at midyear. Most of the slowdown is attributable to marked declines in the rates of growth of civilian machinery and consumer goods.

Civilian machinery continues to be the industrial sector with the highest growth, but the rate of increase was two percentage points less than at midyear. The official Soviet index of

machinery, which includes defense-related production, however, showed the same relatively high rate of growth as in the six-month report, suggesting that there may have been a further boost in the output of military-space hardware.

Industrial support for the agricultural sector was mixed. Increases in the production of tractors and agricultural machinery fell below the modest rates registered earlier, but mineral fertilizer output rose by 24 percent in the third quarter over the comparable period of 1969. If this growth is maintained in the next two quarters, it could have a favorable effect on agricultural production in the 1971 crop year.

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The outlook for the Soviet consumer during the remainder of 1970 is less favorable than indicated in earlier production reports from Moscow. The output of processed foods failed to maintain the improved performance of the first half of the year. Production of processed meat, although somewhat above last year's depressed level, remained only at about the level of 1968. Greater consumer purchasing power intensified the problem of low meat output, resulting in a continuation of severe meat shortages in provincial cities. Moreover, the production of processed fish, the

main protein substitute for meat, dropped off sharply from the level at mid-year and in comparison with the third quarter of 1969. An over-all decline in the growth rate of consumer durables was highlighted by a marked slowing in the growth of refrigerator and washing machine production and by stagnation in the output of television sets. There was a generally slower pace in the production of soft goods, with the largest decline occurring in the rate of growth of leather footwear. [REDACTED]

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Moscow Grasps Opportunities in Somalia and the Sudan

Soviet Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyansky last week became the first Politburo-level Russian leader to visit Somalia and the second of such rank to go to the Sudan. Polyansky's trip, which took place from 20-24 October, constituted both an expression of Soviet satisfaction with the policies pursued by the regimes in Khartoum and Mogadiscio since they came to power last year and an effort to lay the groundwork for even closer military, economic, and political ties in the future.

The occasion for Polyansky's visit to Mogadiscio was the first anniversary of the "Somali Revolution." While there, Polyansky gave a nationwide radio address in which he lauded the regime's policies and warmly welcomed the Somali President's statement that his country "had made a decisive choice in favor of socialism."

Polyansky's visit to Somalia probably had more tangible purposes as well. He undoubtedly pressed the Somalis for closer cooperation and greater contacts, especially in the political and military areas. He was accompanied by Army General P.N. Lashchenko—who went with

Premier Kosygin to Nasir's funeral—and First Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Economic Relations Committee I.V. Arkhipov, whose presence suggests that military and economic aid were discussed. The Soviets, Somalia's chief suppliers of military equipment and training, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The highlight of Soviet economic aid is the Russian-built port at Berbera; otherwise, although such aid has been substantial, it has been poorly planned and badly executed.

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En route to Somalia, Polyansky stopped over in the Sudan, a visit clearly intended as an endorsement of the Numayri regime. Since the coup in May 1969, Khartoum has generally followed Egypt's lead in foreign relations, including the pursuit of closer ties with Moscow. In return, the Soviets have grasped the opportunity to try to make their welcome there more or less permanent. They are developing an air defense system for the Sudan which will include SAMs, jet interceptors, and AAA, and have provided an undetermined amount of ground forces equipment. Some economic aid also has been supplied.

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Moscow's interest in these two countries is not confined to the long-term, ill-defined hope for closer ties as is the case with other non-Arab African states. Somalia's strategic location is paramount, and there have been reports that the Soviets are interested in the use of Somali port facilities in the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, the Soviets may have long-range plans to use Wadi Seidna airfield in northern Sudan, which re-

portedly has been substantially improved to handle larger planes than the Sudanese have in their inventory. Moscow has not yet called its accounts due in Somalia and the Sudan, but it does appear to have some role in mind for these two African countries relating to its larger strategic aims in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. [REDACTED]

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East Germany *Pankow Woos the World*

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) is making an intense effort to obtain the full support of its East European allies in its battle to win diplomatic recognition from West Germany, while leaving no stone unturned in its effort to gain recognition from other Western and nonaligned states. Pankow's highest state and party leaders are increasingly traveling abroad, and are also making it a point to invite foreign delegations to visit East Germany.

The catalyst for this East German activism is primarily West Germany's effort to normalize its relations with Eastern Europe. Pankow hopes that the end result of this normalization will include all East European states simultaneously, in effect making the success of Bonn's policy dependent on West Germany's recognition of East Germany. One of the major purposes of Premier Willi Stoph's late September visit to Warsaw, and of the visit to Prague last week of a delegation led by chief of state and Communist party boss Walter Ulbricht, was to remind Polish and Czechoslovak leaders of Pankow's stand, and at a minimum to urge them to adopt a go-slow approach in their negotiations with Bonn. In a related move, Pankow is also attempting to improve relations with Romania, partly in an effort to persuade Bucharest to use its embassy in Bonn to press East Germany's case more vigorously. [REDACTED]

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East German politburo members are now in France, vainly pressing for recognition of their government. Politburo members and government officials have recently returned from India, Italy, Finland, and the Netherlands. Typical of the East German pitch to nonaligned states is politburo member Albert Norden's remark at a New Delhi press conference last week that "recognition of the GDR is the crucial test of the sincerity of the anti-imperialist struggle." Meanwhile, the East Germans are continuing their vigorous, if unsuccessful, campaign for membership in international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its affiliated bodies.

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Pankow is obviously concerned that it may eventually be forced to accept some "special" relationship with West Germany as the price for international recognition. Its hopes of forestalling such an eventuality rest to a great extent on the willingness of its Communist allies to include recognition of the GDR by Bonn in their price for establishing full diplomatic relations with West Germany. Because the chances for this do not appear good, Pankow is trying to enhance its bargaining position with Bonn by acquiring additional diplomatic recognition elsewhere. [REDACTED]

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Yugoslavia Looks Westward

President Tito's stop in Paris on 23 October rounded off nearly two months of intensive personal diplomacy on his part. Since attending the Nonaligned Summit in Lusaka in early September, Tito has in rapid-fire succession met with President Nixon, Belgian Premier Eyskens, West German Chancellor Brandt, acting Dutch Premier Witteveen and French President Pompidou. Viewed individually these meetings have produced nothing exceptional, but collectively they represent a concerted effort on Tito's part to keep Yugoslavia highly visible to Western leaders.

The Yugoslavs' primary motivation for this effort probably stems from their failure to obtain an understanding with the Kremlin that would negate the threat of Soviet interference in Yugoslavia, underlined by the example of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. A marked improvement in Yugoslav diplomatic and economic ties with Peking has also taken place against a backdrop of common concern over Soviet intentions.

Tito is also aware that Yugoslavia's continuation as an independent socialist state rests to a great extent on Western willingness to invest in the nation's future. Nonalignment offers Belgrade only limited economic and political potential for development. The Soviets are not inclined to offer the assistance Belgrade needs, and the Yugoslavs do not trust them.

The highlight of Tito's Western contacts was President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia. Differences in Yugoslav and US policies notwithstanding, subsequent talks between American and Yugoslav

officials confirm Tito's pleasure over the visit and the rapport established between the two. In particular, the Yugoslavs are pleased with the new interest among members of the US business community in opportunities in Yugoslavia since the President's trip.

Other noteworthy Yugoslav-Western contacts include Deputy Foreign Minister Vratusa's visit to Switzerland in mid-September and Assistant Trade Minister Tomic's trip to Washington recently for talks on cotton textile trade. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Warren Nutter spent two highly successful days in Belgrade in early September, which resulted in increased momentum toward renewed US-Yugoslav military contacts.

Danish Foreign Minister Hartling, in Yugoslavia from 10-13 October, concluded a cultural, scientific, and industrial agreement with his hosts. World Bank (IBRD) President Robert McNamara was exceptionally well received during his October visit. He indicated that the IBRD is willing to increase considerably its loans to Belgrade for the 1971-75 period.

In November, Tito will meet with Romanian President Ceausescu and will receive West German Foreign Minister Scheel. On 10 December, the charismatic Yugoslav leader is scheduled to begin an official visit to Italy, which will include an audience with Pope Paul VI. Next spring Tito hopes to visit the US, and French Premier Chaban-Delmas will pay an official visit to Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

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INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: The legal committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) completed its special session this week, deferring action on the US call for a multi-lateral boycott of the air services of any nation harboring hijackers engaged in international

blackmail. The US initiative may receive further consideration at an ICAO meeting at The Hague in early December. The USSR, which recently decided to join ICAO after holding out for 26 years, will participate in this meeting. [REDACTED]

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France and Algeria: *Difficult Negotiations Ahead*

France and Algeria entered into the second round of bilateral negotiations this week on a host of problems outstanding between the two countries. French Foreign Ministry officials have expressed concern about the outlook for a favorable resolution and expect the talks to be "long and difficult." Relations between the two countries have been exacerbated in recent months by disputes over petroleum and wine, the arrest in Algeria early this year of several French nationals, and the recent arrest in Paris of two Algerians—all allegedly engaged in espionage.

Although the two sides have yet to agree on an agenda for negotiations, the primary issue is a revision of the 1965 petroleum accords. These accords govern the operations of French companies in the Sahara, which produce 70 percent of Algeria's total crude oil output. Last July Algeria unilaterally announced an increase in the tax-reference price of oil that in effect would have raised the tax payments of French companies by about 50 percent. Algeria subsequently agreed in preliminary discussions with France to defer implementation of this decision and even seemed amenable to lowering the proposed price. The Algerian Ministry of Industry and Fuels, however, announced last week that Algiers is seeking a substantially higher price. Algeria's objective is not only to achieve greater control over its petro-

leum production but also to increase substantially its oil revenue, which amounted to \$255 million in 1969, in order to finance its ambitious four-year development program.

A French Foreign Ministry official indicated that other issues already raised in exploratory fashion in earlier sessions include Algerian laborers in France and Algerian wine exports to France. On the latter issue, Paris is taking the position that the problem has become one for the European Communities. In view of the signature of the EC wine accord, any wine imports would have to be regulated in accordance with EC terms and requirements. Another problem Paris might raise concerns the jailed French citizens. France is particularly worried because the Algerian Government has thus far been unwilling even to spell out the charges against the Frenchmen.

Despite the difficulties each side expects in working out an acceptable solution, both Paris and Algiers basically desire a negotiated settlement. Pompidou does not have the same special interest in Algeria that De Gaulle had, but he is nonetheless eager to protect France's important economic investment there. Politically he regards this Maghreb country as an important link to the Arab world, in which he has shown increasing interest. [REDACTED]

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ILO: Soviet maneuvers following the recent appointment of a Soviet citizen to a key position in the International Labor Organization (ILO) are likely to provide the major issues when the ILO governing body meets early next month. Moscow is expected to push for the chairmanship—even though an Asian is entitled to the position by regional rotation—and for structural changes

designed to alter ILO's traditional pattern of representation by separate groups of employer, labor, and government officials. The USSR may also try to exploit international resentment over the refusal of the US Congress to appropriate funds to cover the ILO assessment on the US for the second half of 1970. [REDACTED]

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European Community Considers Steps toward Monetary Union

The EC Council of Ministers received this week an ambitious, three-stage plan for full economic and monetary union by the end of the present decade. The plan, drawn up by a group of experts under the chairmanship of Luxembourg's Prime Minister Werner, had been requested last December by the Six.

The Werner report spells out in detail only the projected monetary union's first stage, which, if approved by the Council, could begin next January and last for three years. During this stage, the central banks of the Community would, as a trial measure, coordinate their policies of intervention on the exchange markets in order to keep exchange-rate fluctuations between their currencies within narrower margins than the ones that apply to the dollar. At the same time, the Six would more closely coordinate their fiscal and monetary policies.

The subsequent stages would be agreed on only after the initial phase could be evaluated. Already, however, the report's clear delineation of the political and economic implications of monetary union—involving the creation of new institutions of economic policy-making at the Community level along with increased control by the European Parliament—has caused a stir, mostly within the French Government. Among those favorably disposed to the report, there is some feeling that the plan should have been discreetly less explicit on the institutional side. In

order to approve further work on the basis of the Werner plan, the Council will have to reconcile the French desire to play down the political implications of movement toward monetary union with the German desire to capitalize on those implications.

In talking with US officials, the Commission continues to emphasize its judgment that, because most serious international monetary issues arise between the US and Europe, these problems could be solved more efficiently if there were one European decision center.

The first serious debate of the Werner report in the Council will take place on 23 November. If the first stage is to begin next January, the Commission will soon have to submit draft proposals for its implementation.

The Community has apparently done little concrete thinking about how the British would fit in with its plans for full monetary union. In an understatement, Commission Vice President Barre has conceded that the existence of Britain's overseas sterling balances "would pose some problems." Officially, the British say they have no reservations about the Community's projected movement toward monetary union; unofficially, however, there may be considerable uncertainty in the UK about the relation between the Community actions and the enlargement negotiations. [REDACTED]

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UN-MIDDLE EAST: The debate on the Middle East situation in the General Assembly has produced considerable acrimony and little substantive progress. An Egyptian draft resolution, sponsored by several African states in an attempt to obtain greater nonaligned support, has been subjected to countervailing nonaligned and radical Arab pressures, and the precise language in which

it will be couched remains in doubt. The alternative US draft has received virtually no Western backing, as most countries preferred to deal with the Egyptian proposal, making an effort to tone it down. Sentiment remains strong for some sort of Assembly statement before the 90-day cease-fire ends on 5 November. [REDACTED]

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Jordan: *Husayn Appoints Tough Premier*

Although suspicion and hostility remain on both sides, relations between the government and the fedayeen had begun to stabilize by early this week. The announcement on 28 October of a strong new government headed by Wasfi Tal, however, will raise large doubts among the fedayeen about the feasibility of cooperating with the regime.

A new government-fedayeen "protocol" signed on 22 October amplified some provisions of earlier agreements. Its most important point restricted the bearing of arms in the cities to "authorized elements." Tunisian Premier Bahi Ladgham, who heads the Arab truce commission, said privately that this would, in effect, mean the disarmament of the fedayeen militia, even though this was not being spelled out.

Ladgham has admitted that further work is needed in the north and in the area near Zarqa, but he was sufficiently sure of the situation to hand his post over to a deputy while he returns to Tunisia to report to President Bourguiba. On the way, he apparently intends to visit a number of Arab states that sponsored the Cairo agreement in order to consolidate their support of his mission's work

Ladgham believes that he has been moderately successful in his hope of creating a basis for better working relations between Jordanians and Palestinians. In the past two weeks, he points out, only 10 or 12 people have been killed; some 720 political prisoners have been released, leaving only about 300 in government hands; and the fedayeen newspaper Al Fatah has been licensed and its first two issues have been moderate and unexception-

able in tone. He feels that government plans to register all fedayeen weapons could, if properly handled, lead eventually to disarmament.

In retrospect, Ladgham views the most valuable achievement of his mission as its reaffirmation of Jordanian sovereignty. The few concessions made to the fedayeen, in Ladgham's opinion, catered mainly to fedayeen self-esteem; the writ of vital government forces—the military, the police, and the court system—had been carefully preserved intact.

King Husayn has recently been giving his hawkish relative, Zaid bin Shakir, a prominent role in dealing with the fedayeen—presumably to warn the commandos that the monarch is not to be pushed too far. In his capacity as the government member of the joint military committee charged with implementing certain provisions of the mid-October agreement, Shakir has—predictably—taken a hard line against the fedayeen.

Now, apparently, the king has been emboldened by the attitude of the Ladgham committee and the success of Shakir's tough tactics; in his appointment of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal, known for his staunch opposition to radicalism, Husayn has given Shakir a strong civilian partner in the process of establishing internal stability in Jordan.

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Libya: RCC Continues to Confound

The strong statements on foreign policy made recently by Deputy Premier Jallud to the US ambassador in Tripoli not only underscore the Libyan regime's radical outlook but raise once more the continuing question on the status of the various members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Since the RCC was established following the coup in September 1969, its position as the collegial governing body of the Libyan Arab Republic has not been seriously questioned. On the other hand, very little hard information has emerged on the internal workings of the council and the relationships among its members.

In an apparently calculated presentation to the ambassador last week, Jallud denounced in unequivocal terms US policy toward the Middle East—particularly Israel—and expressed his government's adamant opposition to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jallud's credentials as a spokesman and negotiator for the RCC are impeccable: he has successfully managed the British military withdrawal, the US evacuation of Wheelus Air Base, and the recent agreements on increased oil pricing. His next mission is to terminate outstanding military procurement agreements with Britain.

Jallud's seemingly authoritative position has been clouded, however, by a spate of reports over the past year indicating that he has serious dif-

ferences with Premier Qaddafi. The most recent alleged incident was a highly personal quarrel that took place about two weeks before Jallud's conversation with the ambassador. In September, furthermore, Jallud had been shifted from the Ministry of Interior to that of Economy, a move some observers considered a demotion.

Only a month later, further cabinet changes removed Jallud's successor at the Ministry of Interior while giving Jallud the duties—if not the title—of the treasury minister, who was also dropped. These changes seem to indicate that—despite their most recent quarrel—the premier and his deputy have established a working arrangement. The reasons for the cabinet changes themselves still remain a mystery, which available reports merely deepen by offering conflicting versions.

that some members of the RCC, all of whom are army officers, may have decided after a year of verbal squabbling that it is time to try more active opposition to the leadership. In any case, it is still not clear who sides with Qaddafi and who opposes him, making for a very touchy and unpredictable government.

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SYRIA-IRAQ: The struggle apparently continues for the top spots in both the Syrian and Iraqi branches of the Baath Party. In Damascus, the story most often heard is that Defense Minister Asad has upgraded his own personal position as

well as that of the party's military faction at the expense of President Atasi, who also holds the post of premier, and the civilian wing. A party congress scheduled for this week allegedly will grapple with the leadership question.

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In Baghdad, the situation is just as cloudy. Hardan Tikriti, one of two vice presidents, has been pushed out of power and out of the country as well, allegedly over miscues on his part in connection with the Iraqi role in the Jordan crisis.

Revolution Command Council Deputy Chairman Saddam Tikriti is said to have stepped up the power ladder, but here, as in Damascus, the whole story is not in, and more changes are probably in store.

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Bickering and Dissension Grow in Southern Yemen

Factionalism is now so rife at the top levels of the ruling National Front that both its General Command and its Executive Committees are frequently unable to function, causing a delay in decision-making that is resulting in widespread uncertainty.

The regime's pro-Soviet strong man, National Front Secretary General Ismail, is increasingly at odds with his chief rival, Prime Minister Haytham, over the question of whether to hold early trials for the followers of deposed president al-Shabi. Haytham, head of a pro-Egypt faction, has sought a reconciliation with al-Shabi's followers by delaying the trials and advocating the release of political prisoners. Although the two men cooperated recently in rallying public support for a provisional constitution, they are long-time antagonists. Ismail, a doctrinaire socialist and veteran National Front theoretician, had some of Haytham's associates arrested this spring for allegedly conspiring with Egyptian officials. Nevertheless, the prime minister retains support within the armed forces and among moderate National Front members, although the death of President Nasir has weakened his position.

A pro-Peking group has also emerged in the National Front. The cabinet minister who heads this faction has been building a personal organization, and seems to have used Ismail's two-month absence in Moscow this spring to solidify his position. He has secured the election of many of his supporters to provincial and local councils of the party structure, and has gotten others appointed to government posts.

Meanwhile, fighting and unrest fomented by the dissident National Unity Front has been reported in tribal areas. The incidents have not been numerous, but the regime's toughest and most loyal army unit has been sent to protect the route from the Yemen Arab Republic to Aden, and other troops have been moved to deal with guerrilla operations mounted from bases in Yemen. Although the Front is supported by Saudi Arabia, its acts are more an annoyance than a serious threat. In fact, the Front's motley collection of malcontents, conservatives, and leftists seems likely to disintegrate eventually as a result of continuing internal discord.

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Congo (Kinshasa): *First National Elections Since 1965*

The Congolese will go to the polls this weekend for the first time since President Mobutu seized power in 1965. They will cast their votes for president on 31 October and 1 November and for candidates to the National Assembly on 14 and 15 November. Although the voters will not have any choice of candidates, the elections will give some indication of Mobutu's success in developing broad support for his policies.

Elections had been deferred for several years, not so much because of the Congo's uncertain security situation but because of Mobutu's desire to build his own political party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR), into a mass organization. He sees the MPR as an instrument to lessen his dependence on the army—which remains his main base of support—and as an outlet for the energies of ambitious politicians who might otherwise become potential rivals. Additionally, he hopes that party activities will help increase the national awareness of the rural Congolese.

The most important part of the electoral process was completed last month when Mobutu and party leaders selected the 420 candidates for the National Assembly from the 2,500 MPR members who wished to stand for office. These candidates are running unopposed, and their

names are simply being submitted to the voters of the 36 electoral districts for approval or disapproval. In an attempt to lessen regional political ties, none of the districts corresponds geographically to provincial subdivisions, and no candidate is permitted to run in his native area. As the sole candidate for president, Mobutu is assured of election.

The elections are being held one month earlier than originally scheduled, partially because Mobutu was fearful that some politicians might use a lengthy campaign to compete for personal popularity. He may have also been eager to have the balloting out of the way because of reports of increased rebel activity in the eastern Congo, a potentially embarrassing development.

The MPR has failed to arouse much grassroots enthusiasm for Mobutu. Voting is mandatory for all persons over 18, however, and a substantial turnout for the elections will create the impression that his regime has nationwide support. Mobutu will exercise tight control over the newly elected assembly, and will confine it basically to rubber-stamping his decisions. Even so, the assembly will be useful to Mobutu as a source of patronage for MPR stalwarts and as an outlet for tribal and regional grievances and political energies. [REDACTED]

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TANZANIA - ZAMBIA - COMMUNIST CHINA: Construction of the Tan-Zam railroad was officially launched this week in Tanzania and Zambia, although preparatory work has been under way since July. When it is completed sometime in 1975, the Chinese-financed railroad will run 1,060 miles from Zambia's copper mines to the port of Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean.

Over 4,000 Chinese technical personnel are already working on the line and, according to Tanzanian President Nyerere, there will be a total of 7,000 Chinese in the two countries by the end of the year. Construction reportedly will be carried on simultaneously in Tanzania and Zambia. [REDACTED]

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Chile Changes Governments

Salvador Allende will become president of Chile on 3 November, having received overwhelming congressional confirmation of his 36.3-percent plurality in the presidential election last month. Official delegations being named to attend his inauguration indicate a noncommittal attitude by most countries toward the prospect of a Marxist government.

The full support given Allende in the congressional runoff by the Christian Democrats indicates that initially he probably will meet with little parliamentary opposition to the far-reaching programs he has promised to put into effect swiftly. The "building of socialism" that Allende has predicted, however, may be affected by economic considerations and by serious differences among members of his coalition. In the eight weeks since Allende's narrow electoral victory, there appears to have been little significant progress in coordinating the plans and reconciling the ambitions within the coalition.

The struggle over the naming of a cabinet has revealed and exacerbated these differences. Allende's own extremist Socialists have held out for top ministries, to the dismay of the Communists and the other contenders. Socialist control of the posts they demand would give the government a more radical cast than the low-key, non-provocative beginning the Communists and perhaps Allende reportedly had envisioned.

The Chilean Foreign Ministry expects more than 60 official delegations at the inauguration, and the Communists claim that 90 countries will be represented. The ranks will be swelled by 42 labor delegations from such countries as North

Korea and East Germany and an extensive list of artistic notables invited by Allende's UP coalition. Although the North Vietnamese delegation will be "unofficial," it reportedly will be headed by the vice minister of foreign affairs. The five-man Soviet delegation will be led by the vice president of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza's position that he will attend the ceremonies in order to avoid appearing to discriminate against Allende is shared by some Latin American governments. Others in the hemisphere and some Western European countries want to send "proper" delegations in the hope of putting pressure on Allende to "resist radicalization." Chile's most important neighbor, Argentina, is deeply worried over the implications of Allende's government but wishes to appear friendly. It will send a cabinet minister, as will several other countries including Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Brazil and Paraguay, which do not hide their distaste for Allende, will be represented only by their ambassadors.

The assassination of Army Commander in Chief Schneider has practically ended the possibility of any military action against Allende. It apparently has unified the armed forces behind acceptance and support of him as constitutional president in a way that few other developments could have done. It also has strengthened Allende's position with the shocked Chilean public; leftist propaganda has been warning incessantly that rightists would make some desperate move to avert Allende's assumption of the presidency and has already claimed Schneider is a martyr of the UP.

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Bolivia: *Guerrillas Plan to Persevere*

Despite the loss of its leader, Oswaldo "Chato" Peredo, the National Liberation Army (ELN) is determined to continue guerrilla warfare. The group may be hard pressed, however, to resume significant guerrilla activities in the near future.

The army's capture of Peredo is a serious setback for the ELN, which has seen its original guerrilla group almost wiped out in clashes with the army since its raid on a US-owned mining installation at Teoponte on 19 July. During that raid, the ELN left behind a statement identifying Bolivian, foreign, and student members of the ELN, without specifying that they had taken part in the Teoponte raid. Subsequent government identifications of dead and captured guerrillas include a large number of those named. If the original list was based on the ELN's strength on a nationwide basis, the group's losses during the past three months have seriously damaged its basic structure.


There are no firm estimates of the number of guerrillas the ELN can still depend on for active operations, but there probably are not many. There is no good indication that significant numbers of trained and motivated recruits have recently joined the ELN. Even stronger evidence of the ELN's weakness was its failure to open a second guerrilla front concurrent with the Teoponte operation. Such action would have diverted military forces and aided the Teoponte guerrillas to expand their operations or to withdraw successfully. This inaction strengthens the likelihood that the ELN committed the overwhelming majority of its trained personnel to the original operation at Teoponte and will require a period of reorganization, probably lasting several months, before it can continue serious guerrilla activities. This view is reinforced by the statement of an anonymous ELN leader to the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina that the ELN does not know how soon its operations will "resume."

The Interior Ministry officially has denied press reports that guerrillas are active in the eastern department of Santa Cruz, where the army defeated Che Guevara's guerrilla forces in 1967. The ministry said, however, that about 50 armed students had seized a large plantation in the area.

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Aside from the original press reports, there is no confirmation of a questionable communiqué, allegedly from the ELN, claiming that it has opened two new guerrilla fronts in the Santa Cruz area.

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Despite its losses, the ELN is not ready to renounce its posit on that guerrilla warfare is the only means of achieving a successful revolution. Immediately after Juan Jose Torres assumed the presidency of Bolivia, the ELN, then under "Chato" Peredo, announced that it planned to continue guerrilla warfare. After Peredo's capture, the anonymous ELN leader repeated the group's

determination to continue operations in Bolivia and stressed that similar tactics would be necessary throughout the hemisphere. He specifically stated that the Velasco government in Peru and Salvador Allende in Chile would not be able to achieve "revolutionary" changes and that guerrilla warfare would continue to be necessary in those countries.

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Brazil: *More on Church-State Friction*

President Medici's efforts to improve relations with the Catholic Church are encountering opposition from some military sectors. These officers are determined to weed out what they consider subversive elements in the clergy and Catholic lay organizations; they believe that Medici's efforts at conciliation are hampering their campaign.

Recent friction has resulted from arrests of several prelates and laymen in September and October, coupled with a government-sponsored campaign to discredit controversial Archbishop Helder Camara. An emergency meeting of the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) directorate in mid-September issued a firm con-

demnation of the recent arrests and stated that the church had an obligation to work toward alleviating serious social problems, no matter what the cost. The CNBB also sent a "letter of fraternal support" to Dom Helder, who is presently in Europe.

Criticism of the government also came from abroad. In Belgium, 4,000 demonstrators protested the arrests of members of the Catholic Worker Youth (JOC) movement, which is headquartered in Brussels, and called upon the Belgian Government and the Vatican to exert pressure on the Brazilian administration to end the arrests and alleged tortures. On 21 October, Pope Paul VI clearly alluded to Brazil in a public statement condemning "cruel and inhumane police methods," even though they were used to combat political violence and defend public order. The pontiff's appointment of CNBB president Cardinal Rossi to a key post in his unofficial cabinet—the first Latin American ever to be so honored—may have been due in part to a desire to be better informed about developments in the world's largest Catholic country.

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Cardinal Sales Reviewing Troops in Brasilia

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Recent governments have backed away from any open confrontation with the church, fearing, justifiably, that in the long run the administration would be the loser in such a contest. If those in the military who regard the church as the country's foremost subversive influence continue to press their views, however, simmering church-state tensions could become a major problem and even threaten the stability of the Medici administration.

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Venezuela: *Government Clamps Down on University*

This week the Venezuelan Government took a decisive step in its long struggle against leftist control of the universities by sending police and national guard troops to occupy the campus of Central University in Caracas.

The current round of strife began last July with mild student protest against a university reform law that had been proposed to Congress. The law was aimed at correcting administrative and financial inefficiency in the national universities, but the question of university autonomy was at the heart of the matter. Leftist students feared that the new law would weaken their power base; such an eventuality indeed seems to have been one of the main aims of the bill. Protest violence has occurred sporadically since passage of the bill in early September.

Opposition to the law by the rector of Central University, Jesus Maria Bianco, set the stage for the occupation. To dramatize his protest, Bianco refused to attend meetings of the Pro-

visional National Universities Council, which had been set up to administer the law. By mid-October the council had decided to suspend Bianco as rector of Central University, using his opposition to the law as a legal pretext.

On 23 October Bianco yielded to pressure and resigned. He refused to vacate his office, however, and urged the students to resist the appointment of a successor. In answer to Bianco's continuing refusal to abide by the law, the government occupied the campus early Monday morning.

Bianco and his leftist followers reportedly have called for a nationwide student strike and some violent reaction to the occupation can be expected. It appears, however, that the university reform law and the subsequent occupation of the Central University campus may put an end to ten years of Communist dominance and disruptive activities in the national universities.

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Bahamas: *Pindling's Political Troubles Worsen*

Prime Minister Pindling's political leadership is increasingly threatened by growing dissension within his government and party.

Minister of Education Wallace-Whitfield's dramatic resignation, announced at the annual convention of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) that ended last week, has set the stage for a struggle to control the party and the government. Wallace-Whitfield, generally accepted as Pindling's successor, has steadily increased his following, and his resignation will have significant effects on future political developments. He now has the support of ten PLP dissidents and seven opposition and independent members of the House of Assembly. This is three less than the total needed to carry a vote of no confidence in the 38-member parliament. A second cabinet member, Minister of Health Dr. Curtis McMillan, has also submitted his resignation to the governor; McMillan is a strong supporter of Wallace-Whitfield. These resignations, and the others that may follow, have

placed tremendous pressure on Pindling, because the number and quality of PLP backbenchers still sufficiently loyal to the prime minister to accept cabinet posts have been sharply reduced.

Citing a deteriorating economic situation, an apparent lack of confidence by foreign investors, and Pindling's alleged dictatorial attitude of late, Wallace-Whitfield's supporters have demanded that Pindling resign immediately. If he refuses (as they expect), they intend to campaign in the House of Assembly to "nullify completely" any efforts of his administration to pass legislation. They believe such a move will force him to resign. Other members of the group are proposing that Pindling dismiss immediately the controversial Minister of Home Affairs Arthur Hanna and possibly three other ministers. Wallace-Whitfield would then be asked to assume the Ministry of Finance and replace the dismissed ministers with his supporters. Still another alternative favored by some would be to have a majority of the House of Assembly petition the governor for Pindling's removal. The last resort would be to seek the three required members to carry a vote of no confidence. This is the least desirable, as it would require the calling of new elections. An electoral campaign would put a heavy financial and administrative burden on the PLP at a time when it is in a general state of disarray.

Pindling is not expected to give up easily, however. He has been an adroit politician, but it now appears that the opposing forces are becoming as determined to remove him as he is to stay in office. It is possible that Pindling, if pressed too heavily, would call for new elections and seek a new mandate from the people, with whom he is still popular.



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Colombia: *Opposition Moves Left*

Rojas Pinilla's National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) has again succeeded in challenging the Pastrana administration. The Chamber of Deputies failed to elect a comptroller general of the republic after two votes were taken on 22 October. Antonio Ordonez, supported by ANAPO and others, received more votes than the ruling National Front candidate; in fact, Ordonez received more votes in the recent balloting than he did on 30 September. Unless an accommodation is reached, the Chamber will not be able to elect a national comptroller, attorney general, or vice president, as a two-thirds vote is required for election to these positions. Foreign Minister Vasquez, because of his precedence, will remain de facto vice president of Colombia.



Maria Eugenia Rojas
de Moreno

that is emerging in ANAPO's political direction. Evidence suggests that ANAPO's leader, Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno, intends to adopt an extreme leftist-Marxist ideology and to formulate programs emphasizing the "class struggle." Mrs. Moreno has stressed that she does not intend ANAPO to become a Communist movement. She believes, however, that a political group striving for social revolution must adopt some fundamental Marxist concepts in order to attract the masses. It is not clear whether this shift to the left has already begun, although there is evidence that the Communist Party has penetrated ANAPO, especially in the poorer urban districts. In some cases the Communists are directing ANAPO activities.

A group of conservative ANAPO congressmen reportedly is concerned over the growing Marxist and pro-Communist influence at the higher levels of ANAPO. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Moreover, there is concern among them that the rightists have yielded the initiative within ANAPO to the leftists, on whom the ANAPO leadership is increasingly relying to motivate the pro-Rojas masses. As the leftist elements assume more important roles, Mrs. Moreno is likely to find it increasingly difficult to bring them under her control. [REDACTED]

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ECUADOR: The kidnaping on 27 October of the commander of the air force probably will give further impetus to the government's campaign against its opponents. The administration has been on the offensive against its foes since President Velasco assumed dictatorial powers in June. The timing of the kidnaping—during celebrations commemorating the 50th anniversary of the air force attended by several foreign delegations—was especially embarrassing to the administration. It responded with strong measures, including the establishment of martial law and a curfew, and

immediately began a roundup of political opponents. Velasco probably believes that a strong stand will ensure continued military support and give him a free rein to deal with both the small subversive groups in the country and his legitimate political foes. As time passes without an authenticated communiqué from the still-unidentified kidnapers, the possibility that the general has been killed increases, as does the possibility that the government will feel compelled to take harsher retaliatory action against suspected terrorists. [REDACTED]

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